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The Change in Work Arrangements 
in Denmark and Germany
Erosion or Renaissance of Standards?
Edeltraud Hoffmann and Ulrich Walwei
Institute for Employment Research, Nuremburg
In all industrial countries, the composition of work arrangements is
in a state of flux (Delsen 1995; Meulders, Plasman, and Plasman 1996;
de Grip, Hoevenberg, and Willems 1997). Supply and demand in the
labor market can be managed in different ways. In addition to the typi-
cal employment relationship, work can be contracted out to (nomi-
nally) self-employed persons. The duration of employment can be
unlimited or on a fixed-term basis. Individual working hours can vary
considerably. Moreover, there can be complex contractual relations
between employer and employee, as in the case of temporary work
agencies, for example.
To assess the impact of the various work arrangements, a reference
point is needed, and in this chapter, we use the dominant work arrange-
ment in quantitative terms. The “standard work arrangement” is based
on a permanent, full-time employee-employer relationship subject to
basic social security contributions.
In many countries, the growing number of work arrangements that
diverge from the “standard work arrangement” continues to cause
fierce controversy. Depending on one’s point of view, either hopes or
fears are articulated over the mainly female part-time workforce, who
are socially protected to varying degrees; or over the many new staff
who are employed only on a fixed-term basis; or over the trend of elim-
inating employment risks by using temporary agency workers or by
contracting out work to (nominally) self-employed people. In view of
the growing variety of work arrangements and changes in workers’
preferences, it is, however, no longer easy to assess which work
arrangements are associated with which opportunities and risks for
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society and for the individual. On the one hand, nonstandard work
arrangements are considered less regulated than the typical employ-
ment relationship and, therefore, also have less protection from a legal
point of view. On the other hand, they represent transitional forms or
bridges to the standard work arrangement.
This chapter does not aim to assess the various implications of
nonstandard work arrangements for the labor market or individuals in
terms of “pros” and “cons,” or “good” and “bad.” Such issues would
preferably be analyzed using longitudinal data on career development
and processes of mobility (see, e.g., other chapters in this book).
Instead, our chapter regards such arrangements as outcomes of differ-
ent forces and looks specifically to the reasons for this ongoing devel-
opment. Unfortunately, knowledge about the determinants of change is
still rather limited. We know more about what is not the cause than of
what is the cause of the changes in the composition of work arrange-
ments. In particular, shift-share analyses have shown that, irrespective
of the sector-specific and gender-specific changes in employment, non-
standard work arrangements would have increased and to roughly the
same extent (see Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998; Hoffmann and Wal-
wei 1999). Furthermore, analyses suggest that behavior of employers
and employees has changed over time within certain sectors as well as
within certain demographic groups. One possible reason could be the
newly available options for employers and employees. The choice of
work arrangements for both sides of the market depends, not in the
least, on which alternatives they have at their disposal. The labor mar-
ket performance, as well as the institutional setting, particularly influ-
ences the scope of action.
The relevance of labor market performance to the composition of
work arrangements is obvious from an employee viewpoint. For the
majority of employees, nonstandard work arrangements are an inferior
good, and the least preferable if better options are available. The insti-
tutional framework may also influence costs and benefits of various
work alternatives. For example, an institutional setting that imposes
high costs for employers can make full-time arrangements less attrac-
tive for employers and reduce their prevalence. To deal with this set of
questions, it makes sense to look beyond national borders. Interna-
tional comparisons allow us to integrate the relative importance of
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labor market performance and institutional settings as possible explan-
atory factors.
This chapter begins by describing changes to the composition of
work arrangements in Western Europe. We outline in which countries
the tendency of erosion is already visible and the speed of change. In
the next section, the analysis focuses on Germany and Denmark, where
the development of work arrangements took different directions. In
Germany, nonstandard work arrangements grew in importance, while
the opposite occurred in Denmark. In Germany, the question is how far
the growth in nonstandard work arrangements can be considered a pro-
cess of catching up with other countries, such as the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and Spain, in the diversity of employment relation-
ships. In Denmark, the question is whether the decline in nonstandard
work arrangements indicates a renaissance of “normal employment.”
We conclude by asking whether the changes lead to more diversity in
work arrangements or to newly defined standards.
WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
Overall Trends
The diversity of work arrangements is greater than official labor
market statistics suggest. There is, for example, a considerable lack of
internationally comparable data on temporary work agencies, home
work, on-call work, or freelancers. At best, only national data are avail-
able. The European Labor Force Survey (ELFS) offers at least detailed
information about self-employment, part-time employment, and tem-
porary employment.1 Table 2.1 provides an overview of such work
arrangements and their development over time.
Nonstandard work arrangements covered by the ELFS play a quite
different role in European Union (EU) countries. In 1998, the highest
share of self-employed (including family workers) could be found in
southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
In contrast, self-employment was comparatively low in Luxembourg,
Denmark, and Germany. In all countries, self-employment decreased.2
The picture is quite the opposite concerning part-time and temporary




(incl. family workers) Part-time employment
Temporary 
employment a
Member states 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998
Denmark 2,683 2,679 11.0 9.7 23.7 22.3 10.2 9.1
Germany 35,537 — 11.0 — 18.3 — 10.9
West 26,999 29,077 11.5 11.5 13.2 20.0 10.1 10.0
East 6,459 — 8.5 — 12.0 — 17.0
Austria 3,626 — 13.8 — 15.8 — 6.8
Belgium 3,483 3,857 18.0 17.4 9.8 15.7 4.5 6.4
Spain 11,709 13,161 29.1 23.0 5.4 8.1 15.8 25.3
Finland 2,179 — 14.6 — 11.7 — 15.1
France 21,503 22,469 16.2 12.5 12.0 17.3 6.6 12.2
Greece 3,651 3,967 49.5 43.4 5.5 6.0 8.8 7.4
Ireland 1,090 1,496 25.3 20.2 8.0 16.7 6.8 6.1
Italy 21,085 20,357 29.5 28.7 5.6 7.4 4.1 6.1
Luxembourg 152 171 11.2 9.4 6.6 9.4 3.3 2.4
Netherlands 5,903 7,402 12.1 11.6 30.3 38.8 7.7 11.2
Portugal 4,427 4,764 30.9 28.2 6.5 11.1 12.6 12.4
Sweden 3,946 11.4 23.9 11.4
United Kingdom 25,660 26,883 12.7 12.5 21.9 24.9 5.2 6.1
European Union 128,345 152,494 19.1 16.6 13.2 17.4 7.8 10.6
NOTE: — = data were unavailable.
a Temporary employees include apprentices, trainees, research assistants, etc.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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employment. In most of the EU countries, both types of employment
grew, but at different rates. The ELFS data show high part-time
employment rates in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden,
and Denmark. Low rates are found in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Luxem-
bourg. In the case of temporary employment, Spain, Finland, Portugal,
and France ranked highest, whereas Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom ranked lowest.
Table 2.1 is a useful overview of the importance of different work
arrangements in EU countries. For several reasons, however, such indi-
cators offer only a superficial impression. First, nonstandard work
arrangements covered by the ELFS are not clear-cut. Double counting
is possible. For example, the self-employed can either work full-time
or part-time. In addition, part-time and temporary employment can be
arranged simultaneously. Moreover, the definitions of such types of
employment are not precise (Lemaitre, Pascal, and Bastelaer 1997).
Temporary workers in the ELFS may include apprentices, agency
workers, or even participants of active labor market measures, such as
job-creation schemes. Part-time work consists of a wide range of
employment relationships, including the extremes of marginal employ-
ment (few hours of work) and jobs with working hours just below the
full-time level. The proportion of self-employment among total
employed also varies significantly, not the least because the agricul-
tural sector plays a different role in the countries surveyed. In addition,
self-employment rates include self-employed workers with or without
employees. Even permanent, full-time working relationships may
include unique employment statuses, such as civil servants who enjoy
life-long tenure.
Although a more detailed study of work arrangements in different
countries would be helpful, the complexity and effort make such a
study difficult in many countries. Therefore, it is more practical to con-
centrate the analyses on countries with an exemplary character. Of spe-
cial interest are countries in which developments moved in different
directions, as in Denmark and Germany. 
Work Arrangements in Germany and Denmark
Figure 2.1 shows the development of work arrangements in Den-
mark and Germany. The percentages for two years, 1985 and 1998,
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represent the share of particular work arrangements as a portion of total
employment.
Germany
In Germany, the proportion of standard work arrangements (i.e.,
permanent full-time employment relationships) declined in the last
decade compared with other forms of employment.3 Although the over-
all self-employment rate (including family workers) declined slightly,
the rate of self-employment grew in the sectors outside agriculture.
Temporary employment (including apprentices) increased slightly over
time. The work arrangement showing the fastest growth was part-time
employment on a permanent basis, with an increase of 5 percentage
points.
In 1998, the composition of work arrangements in eastern Ger-
many still differed considerably from those in western Germany. This
partly reflects the ongoing process of radical structural change and
transformation of the eastern German economy (see below, Determi-
nants of Change section). In the new Länder, standard work arrange-
ments still carried greater weight. The difference in the proportion of
standard work arrangements between eastern and western Germany in
1998 was 3 percentage points. 
Figure 2.1 Change in Work Arrangements in Denmark and Germany 
(% total employment in 1985 and 1998)
a 1985 West Germany; 1998 includes the new German Länder.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey; Mikrozensus.
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Denmark
Interestingly, the proportion of standard work arrangements in
Denmark was similar to that in Germany in 1998 (see Figure 2.1). But
unlike Germany, the share of standard work arrangements increased by
5 percentage points between 1985 and 1998. In addition, the composi-
tion of work arrangements differs between Denmark and Germany. In
Denmark, the proportion (as a fraction of total employment) of part-
time employment was higher, and the shares of self-employed and tem-
porary workers were lower in 1998.
Also in Denmark, the overall self-employment rate, which in 1998
was lower than in Germany, decreased slightly. However, unlike in
Germany, the proportion of self-employed outside the agricultural sec-
tor stagnated. In the case of temporary employment and part-time
work, the picture is different, too. The decline of temporary employ-
ment is largely associated with fewer apprenticeships (with fixed-term
contracts) in Denmark. The proportion of part-time employment




With regard to nonstandard work arrangements, a lack of employ-
ment opportunities and high unemployment must be regarded as a
“push factor.” In this respect, labor markets in Denmark and Germany
reveal remarkable differences. The differences refer to the level, devel-
opment, and composition of employment as well as unemployment. 
For decades, Denmark has had one of the highest labor force par-
ticipation rates in the Western world. In 1998, the labor force participa-
tion rate reached 79 percent. The corresponding German rate stood at
71 percent. The difference is even greater if one compares employment
rates in both countries. Whereas 75 percent of the Danish working pop-
ulation was employed in 1998, in Germany, 64 percent was employed.
After a recession in the early 1990s, Denmark saw a considerable
employment boom. This positive development can be attributed to sev-
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eral factors, such as sustained economic improvement, fiscal impulses
through tax cuts, and changes in active and passive labor market poli-
cies that targeted the unemployed as well as imposed sanctions (PLS
Consult and Peter Jensen 1997; Madsen 1999).
Between 1983 and 1998, the German figures show a rather mixed
picture. For western Germany, the rate of employment growth was
almost as high as in Denmark (10.7 percent vs. 11.4 percent). Employ-
ment indexes in the early 1990s indicate much greater development
than in Denmark. The picture changes, however, if one considers
employment indexes in unified Germany. In contrast to the Danish
development, unified Germany experienced a slow economic and labor
market recovery in the 1990s (see Figure 2.2), mainly because of the
unification of West and East Germany in 1990. At first (especially
because of the emergence of new markets in East Germany), the
Figure 2.2 Employment Indexes in Denmark and Germany 1983–98 
(Index: 1991 = 100)
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
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former West Germany experienced a considerable economic and
employment boom. However, the recovery process in eastern Germany
took more time than most experts and politicians predicted. For this
reason, eastern Germany still depends on massive financial transfers
from western Germany. Therefore, unification has certainly made it
more difficult to find convincing solutions to the employment crisis. It
would, however, be insufficient to blame only German unification in
this context (Blau et al. 1997). Several structural deficiencies in Ger-
many are also responsible, such as the high burden of taxes and of
social security contributions, too few employment-oriented wage
agreements, and a lack of progress in increasing labor market flexibil-
ity.
In Denmark, the high employment rate gives less competitive
workers more opportunities to enter the labor market. All age groups,
all qualification levels, and both sexes have higher participation rates
than in Germany. That means that women, young people, older work-
ers, and even those with low skills were able to profit, at least in part,
from high levels of employment.
Not surprisingly, differences in the level and the development of
unemployment between Denmark and Germany are also evident. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows lower unemployment rates in Denmark than in Germany
since 1994. Whereas in Denmark, unemployment has decreased con-
tinuously since 1993, improvements in Germany began only recently.
In Germany, the very recent (since 1996) and slight reduction in the
unemployment rate can be attributed only in part to more employment;
the shrinking labor supply, owing to demographic changes, also played
a part. The positive employment development in Denmark, together
with an intensive use of active labor market policies (especially the
high number of short-term measures), has lowered the proportion of
long-term unemployed (as part of the total unemployed) from 39 per-
cent in 1985 to 29 percent in 1998, and lowered the youth (up to age
25) unemployment rate from 11 percent to 7 percent. In the same
period, the proportion of long-term unemployment in Germany rose
from 48 percent to 52 percent, and the unemployment rate of young
people ages 15–24 remained at about 10 percent.
Unemployment represents only a part of total underemployment
(Schmidt 1997; Stille 1998). Using the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) concept of “broad unemploy-
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ment” in assessing underemployment, the corresponding rate in 1996
for Germany was 22 percent (the standardized unemployment rate in
1996 was 9.6 percent) and for Denmark, 20.5 percent (the standardized
unemployment in 1996 was 6.9 percent). The definition of broad
unemployment includes registered unemployed, participants in active
labor measures (such as training, job creation schemes, and short-time
work), those in early retirement, and persons in paid leave schemes
(such as child care or training). However, recent Danish studies show
that the standardized unemployment rate, as well as the broad unem-
ployment rate, decreased in the second half of the 1990s, indicating a
“real” improvement in the labor market situation (Madsen 1999).
Institutional Setting
The choice of work arrangements depends on which options
employers and employees have at their disposal. The institutional
Figure 2.3 Unemployment Rates in Germany and Denmark, 1983–98 
(percentage share of labor force)
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
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framework defines the labor market actors’ scope of action. Regula-
tions influence costs and benefits of various alternatives. Although it is
impossible to offer a comprehensive overview of institutions in the two
countries, we focus on those regulations that are of particular impor-
tance to the composition and development of different work arrange-
ments. These include the social security systems and certain incentives
or disincentives resulting from them, the type of income taxation, the
provision of child care facilities, the level and the significance of active
labor market measures, the existence of particular institutions facilitat-
ing the school-to-work transition, and the strictness of employment
protection regulations.
The Danish social security system provides a generous social pro-
tection (e.g., in the case of unemployment). It is mainly financed by
general tax revenues (European Commission 1999). In 1997, the share
of social security contributions amounted to only 10 percent of the
labor costs (defined as gross salary plus social security contributions
paid by the employer), the lowest in the EU. The corresponding share
for Germany was much higher at 34 percent. Because of German unifi-
cation, the burden of social security contributions has risen signifi-
cantly. This has led to an increase in labor costs of employment
relationships covered by social insurance. As a consequence, the sub-
stitution of labor through capital was stimulated, and gainful activities
were at least in part pushed from the regular to the underground mar-
ket. On the supply side of the labor market, higher social security con-
tributions have increased the tax wedge between gross and net wages.
The lower the advantages of rising social security contributions for
employees, the greater the disincentives to work in jobs covered by
social insurance. As a result, work arrangements that are not subject to
social security contributions (e.g., marginal employment or work given
to nominally self-employed workers) become more attractive (Buch
1999).
In addition to financing, the design of the Danish and German
social security systems is also quite different. The pension system in
Denmark consists of a basic pension for all citizens, financed by gen-
eral revenue taxes, and a supplementary pension, financed mainly by
employer contributions. In contrast, pension insurance in Germany is
mandatory for all wage and salary earners and is (apart from taxes) pre-
dominantly financed by payroll taxes, to be paid almost equally by
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employer and employee contributions. The German compulsory pen-
sion insurance scheme was introduced to ensure that all workers enjoy
an adequate old age pension. The level of old age pensions in Germany
largely depends on the range and duration of such payments. Unlike in
Denmark, this leads to a situation in Germany in which less stable
career histories bear considerable risks in terms of social insurance.
Of particular interest in this context are regulations that act as an
incentive for marginal employment. Such regulations, in particular
threshold levels, can refer to the income as well as to the number of
working hours. The new German regulation, which has been valid
since April 1999, relates to the monthly income as well as to the
weekly working hours. Monthly wages below DM 630 are subject to
restricted social insurance (normally no benefits and employer contri-
butions only) if the person is not a multiple job holder and the weekly
working time is fewer than 15 hours. The prior regulation did not
require any compulsory social insurance, whether the person was a
multiple job holder or not, but employers were obliged to pay a payroll
tax, which was nearly as high as the employer’s social security contri-
butions. Similar to Germany, regulations in Denmark also create incen-
tives for marginal employment. To claim unemployment insurance
benefits, an employee must work a minimum of 16 hours per week. For
part-time employment of no more than 39 hours per month, no contri-
butions to the supplementary pension system are due.
The type of income taxation may also influence the magnitude of
labor supply and the associated choice concerning certain wage
arrangements. Whereas Germany has joint income taxation, Denmark
taxes individuals separately (see Dingeldey 2000). Joint taxation can
discourage secondary wage earners from working. In particular, mar-
ried women who work at home are, under joint taxation, taxed at the
high marginal tax rate of their husband. Joint taxation, therefore, cre-
ates another incentive among secondary earners to find tax-free mar-
ginal employment. In contrast, individual taxation has the opposite
effect. The low wage of a part-time working spouse is taxed at a corre-
spondingly low rate.
In addition to the type of income taxation, the employment rates of
women are positively related to the provision of child care facilities.
The availability of publicly funded child care varies sharply between
countries. Denmark is one of the countries with the largest provision of
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care facilities for children up to age 3 (see Thenner 2000). Although
there are no severe limitations concerning kindergarten placements (for
children ages 3–6 years) in Germany, many are part-time placements,
and children usually return home at lunchtime. This situation may
cause a considerable obstacle to full-time work for German women, or
even regular part-time work. 
According to OECD data, Denmark spends the most on active and
passive labor market policies among countries in the western world. In
1998, the share of total expenditure on labor market policies amounted
to 5.63 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). (In Germany, it
was 3.56 percent.) Both countries spent twice as much on passive poli-
cies as on active programs. Of particular interest in this context are
schemes that enable unemployed individuals to start new businesses or,
in the case of job-creation schemes, that are associated with fixed-term
contracts. Leave programs (e.g., for training or child care) can favor
fixed-term contracts because such measures often lead to a temporary
replacement. Table 2.2 gives an overview of the quantitative impor-
tance of labor market programs in both countries in terms of full-time
equivalencies or annual averages.
Both countries changed the emphasis of labor market policies in
the 1990s. The Danish reform in 1993 initiated a considerable swing in
labor market policies. One part of the reform was additional measures
to reduce labor supply (e.g., early retirement, sabbaticals, and paid
leave arrangements). The number of participants in labor market pro-
grams and the composition of expenditure in Denmark reveal a shift in
recent years from demand-side measures (especially wage subsidies) to
supply-side measures (mostly training programs). In Germany, the
shift of labor market policies took place later. Since 1998, labor market
measures have aimed more at improving job matching by concentrat-
ing on targeted programs for hard-to-place individuals. The policies are
either implemented within firms or should, as much as possible, meet
the requirements of firms in order to build a bridge toward standard
employment.
In many countries, a close relationship exists between standard
labor market programs for youth and institutions facilitating the
school-to-work transition. The latter are particularly relevant for Den-
mark and Germany. The Danish vocational education and training pro-
grams are sandwich-type programs, in which a separate theoretical
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education at a vocational school (one-third of total duration) alternates
with practical training on a full-time or part-time basis in a business
enterprise (two-thirds of total duration). The German apprenticeship
system combines part-time education with workplace occupational
training. A characteristic feature of the two systems is fixed-term con-
tracts between the young employees and the employers offering practi-
cal or occupational training (in Denmark, excluding vocational
schools, and in Germany, including vocational schools). Nevertheless,
in both countries, the existing institutions fail to reach all school leav-
ers to whom standard labor market programs are offered.
Finally, employment protection regulations may also influence the
composition of work arrangements. The stricter the dismissal protec-
tion, the more it can act as an incentive for enterprises to select those
forms of employment with little or no dismissal protection (e.g., fixed-
term contracts, use of temporary agency workers, or contracting out
Table 2.2 Participationa in Labor Market Programs in Denmark and 
Germany, 1994 and 1998 (% of civil employment)
Denmark Germany
1994 1998 1994 1998
Subsidized employment (direct job 
creation, short-time work, job 
training, enterprise subsidies, etc.)
2.4 1.7 2.0 1.8
Training measures (adult education/
training, except educational leave)
0.9 1.0 1.4 1.1
Other activation programsb (specially 
arranged activation, experiments)
0.1 0.2
Labor market programs (except leave 
and early retirement)
3.4 2.9 3.4 2.9






Civil employment in thousands 2,508 2,659 35,892 35,715
a Full-time equivalents and annual averages.
b Activation programs link payment of cash benefits to the participation in active labor
market programs.
SOURCE: Denmark: Danmarks Statistisk; Germany: Amtliche Nachrichten der
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit—Arbeitmarkt 1998; Calculations of Institute for Employ-
ment Research (Section 2) Civil Employment: OECD Labor Force Statistics.
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work to self-employed workers). Based on OECD indicators of the
strictness of employment protection regulations in 26 countries in the
Western world, Denmark ranks sixth and Germany ranks twentieth
(OECD 1999). A higher ranking implies more legal restrictions. The
indicator includes regulations concerning individual and mass dis-
missal as well as temporary employment (e.g., fixed-term contracts and
the use of temporary agency workers). The OECD analysis shows a
considerable trend toward deregulation in the 1990s. Amid deregula-
tion, two trends emerged: changes in the law either provided for a
change in the protective rights of regular employment, or they
extended the possibilities of arranging nonstandard work. Regarding
the choice of work arrangements, the two reform trends must be
assessed differently. If regular employment relationships are deregu-
lated—as in the case of a change in law on protection against dis-
missal—evasive reactions (e.g., an increased use of fixed-term
employment) are less likely. If, on the other hand, deregulation is
geared toward an extended use of nonstandard work arrangements, one
must ask whether the additional flexibility is needed and whether it is
used by the parties involved. 
The already flexible Danish labor market in the 1980s was further
deregulated in the early 1990s by an almost complete liberalization of
the use of temporary workers. If one takes the relatively strict employ-
ment protection regulations into account, previous deregulation initia-
tives in Germany were quite moderate. Significant changes in the
regulation of German employment protection mainly apply to tempo-
rary employment. Since 1985, a justification for using fixed-term con-
tracts for fewer than 18 months is no longer required. The duration was
extended further in 1996, to 24 months. Within the maximum duration
of 24 months, the contract can be extended three times. Since 2001, the
use of fixed-term contracts without justification is limited to new
recruitments only, which prevents employers from using such flexible
fixed-term contracts as a means to extend other fixed-term contracts
that require justification (e.g., in the case of fixed-term contracts last-
ing more than 24 months). Similarly, the duration for which employers
can use temporary agency workers (which is still not allowed in con-
struction) was also extended in the 1990s and, since 1997, can now last
for 12 months. 
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To summarize, a comparison of the two countries reveals certain
similarities as well as considerable differences. Denmark and Germany
are both welfare states with high wages and low wage differentiation
by qualification. Apart from the size of the two countries, remarkable
differences exist in the level and development of employment, labor
market flexibility, financing and design of the social security system,
institutional incentives for female employment, and the significance of
active labor market programs. 
SPECIFIC WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN 
DETAIL: DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR CAUSES IN 
DENMARK AND GERMANY
Self-Employment
In 1998, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Germany had the lowest per-
centage of self-employed persons in the EU. The extent of self-
employment is influenced by demand-side, supply-side, and institu-
tional determinants (Noorderhaven et al. 1999; Bogai and Gotthard
1999). A first argument relates to structural change. Agrarian-domi-
nated societies are generally characterized by a high degree of self-
employment. In more developed countries, industrialization and a
higher share of services limit self-employment. Industrialization leads
to increased capital accumulation and business concentration, whereas
a higher share of services leads to business start-ups.
The level of self-employment also depends on the level of prosper-
ity. The share of self-employment is high in countries with low average
incomes, while self-employment rates are comparably lower in coun-
tries with a high living standard. Greater productivity resulting from a
growing capital stock induces relative improvements to wages com-
pared with incomes from self-employment. Higher levels of economic
development offer more alternatives to earn a living. Incentives to
become self-employed are hence reduced.
The size and composition of the labor force may also influence the
level of self-employment. If we assume the same density of self-
employed (i.e., the number of self-employed related to the working
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population) in two countries or at two points of time, the self-employ-
ment rate (as part of total employment) will decrease with a higher, or
growing, employment rate. This is because higher employment is gen-
erally accompanied by greater labor force participation of women, who
in turn are less likely to be self-employed (Blanchflower 1998; Huijgen
1999).
The labor market and labor market institutions can also play a role
in self-employment. Both aspects are considered “push factors.” High
unemployment rates induce more individuals to become self-employed
owing to a lack of jobs in dependent employment. Self-employment
programs aimed at reintegrating the unemployed can reinforce such a
development. Push factors can also come into play with strict employ-
ment protection, high social security contributions, and deregulated
product markets with low barriers to entry.
High living standards, on the one hand, and structural change dis-
favoring the agricultural sector, on the other hand, offer a plausible
explanation for the comparatively low self-employment rates in Den-
mark and Germany. The particularly low share of self-employed and
family workers in Danish employment may also be attributed to sev-
eral additional factors, such as a higher participation rate of both mar-
ried and single women, a more favorable labor market since 1994, less
emphasis on programs promoting business start-ups, and less strict
labor market regulations. The reason for the still comparatively small
proportion of self-employed and family workers in eastern Germany
(8.5 percent compared with 11.5 percent in western Germany) likely
stems from the slow adjustment process in that economy, with its
uncertain prospects and lack of capital. Similarities between Denmark
and Germany on self-employment are also obvious if one compares the
composition and patterns of development.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 reveal that self-employment rates fell in both
countries from 1983 to 1998. The development, however, is largely
influenced by the closing of small agricultural businesses, and thus
reducing the numbers of self-employed workers. Outside the agricul-
tural sector, the opposite has occurred. Self-employment rates in Ger-
many remained relatively constant in the 1980s and increased in the
1990s. The increase was interrupted shortly as a result of German uni-
fication, given that self-employment rates were and still are quite low
in the new Länder. In Denmark, the decline in self-employed (not
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including agriculture) has abated since the mid 1980s (Figure 2.4). As
a consequence, in both countries, extrapolations show increasing levels
of self-employment (especially outside agriculture).
In Denmark and Germany, the share of self-employed with
employees was higher than the share of self-employed without
employees in 1998. Differences between the two rates, however,
diminished with time. In both countries, the increase of self-employ-
ment without employees was above average. A possible explanation
for the increase of one-person businesses may be that market entries
became more feasible for small enterprises because of the rapid diffu-
sion of information and communication technologies. Stronger interna-
tional competition and increasing labor cost pressure, more intensive
contracting out, and concepts of “lean management” may also have
contributed to this development. 
Among the self-employed without employees, there is also
assumed to be an increase in so-called “nominal self-employed.” In
Germany, nominal self-employment may have emerged from the con-
Figure 2.4 Denmark: Self-Employed and Family Workers, 1983–98 
(percentage share of total employment)
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tinuously poor labor market in the 1990s and rising social security con-
tributions that disfavored work arrangements within an employee
status. According to Dietrich (1996), the number of nominal self-
employed in 1995 was between 179,000 and 431,000, or between 0.6
percent and 1.3 percent of total employment.4 The legislature in Ger-
many responded to the increase in one-person businesses, first in 1999
and then again in 2000, by defining the demarcation line between
dependent employment and self-employment.5 The new regulation
aims to reduce the circumvention of labor and social protection laws.
However, it also hampers the initiation of new firms. Individuals start-
ing a new business often do not employ additional workers and deal
early on with one or only a few clients. 
Temporary Employment
In a European comparison, temporary employment rates in Den-
mark and Germany are ranked somewhere in the middle of the spec-
trum. In both countries, trainees and apprentices contribute to
Figure 2.5 Germanya: Self-Employed and Family Workers, 1983–98 
(percentage share of total employment)
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temporary employment to a considerable extent, although in Denmark
with a declining tendency (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). Temporary
employment is, in many cases, associated with part-time work. In Den-
mark, this is more often the case than in Germany. There were no sig-
nificant changes to Danish temporary employment rates during the last
decade, while Germany saw a moderate upward trend. However, tem-
porary employment rates in Denmark and Germany are similar. On the
one hand, this might stem from the fact that the noted restrictions on
the use of fixed-term contracts are only slightly lower in Denmark than
in Germany. On the other hand, dismissal protection in Germany is
much more strict, which can, therefore, cause circumvention by tempo-
rary employment. Thus, lower temporary employment rates (excluding
apprentices) would be expected in Denmark. Possible explanations for
this counterintuitive result may be identified by looking at structural
features of temporary employment, labor market performance, and
institutional issues. 
Figure 2.6 Temporary Employment in Denmark, 1984–98 (percentage of 
total employed)
a Voluntary: “did not want a permanent job.”
b Involuntary: “could not find a permanent job”; “no reason given”; “contract for a pro-
bationary period.”
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Temporary work arrangements are, in general, not the first choice
for the majority of workers employed on a fixed-term basis. According
to the ELFS, permanent work would be preferred if available. “Volun-
tary” temporary employment plays only a small role in Germany, with
0.2 percent of all employed, while in Denmark, this type of employ-
ment is more significant, with 2.4 percent employed in voluntary tem-
porary employment. Permanent contracts are not necessarily the first
choice for employees who are less concerned about the disadvantages
of a temporary contract (e.g., the higher risk of being jobless after the
contract expires). This group could include, for example, individuals
uninterested in a permanent job (pupils or students) or those who were
planning to leave dependent employment (e.g., because of retirement
or the start of a business). The high figures of voluntary temporary con-
tracts in Denmark correspond to the multitude of marginal work carried
out by pupils and students. 
Figure 2.7 Temporary Employment in Germany,a 1985–98 (percentage of 
total employment)
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
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The business cycle is one of the possible determinants of changes
in temporary employment rates. The relationship between unemploy-
ment and temporary employment, however, can be cyclical as well as
countercyclical. Rising unemployment may promote the diffusion of
temporary contracts; falling unemployment may reduce the number of
temporary contracts (as in Denmark, see Figure 2.6). An opposite rela-
tionship might be expected when temporary employment is used as an
employment buffer, which is expanded in cyclical upswings and
reduced in cyclical downswings (as in Germany, possibly). 
As noted above, since 1985, fixed-term employment contracts last-
ing up to 18 months (and since October 1996, up to 24 months) no
longer required justification. Firms have made wide use of the new reg-
ulation (see Bielenski 1997). However, neither the high hopes (e.g.,
encouraging additional hiring due to a substitution of overtime work)
nor the fears (e.g., the replacement of permanent employment by fixed-
term employment) has been confirmed. The relatively constant rates of
temporary employment in Germany during the last decade suggest that
the new options offered by deregulation and the actual use of such
options are two different things. The reality in German firms is obvi-
ously not yet characterized by a regime of “hiring and firing,” and the
advantages of stable employment relationships (internal flexibility,
willingness to invest in human capital) obviously still prevail. This is
true even in eastern Germany. The greater proportion of temporary
employment there can be almost fully attributed to active labor market
programs (especially large-scale job creation schemes).
In Denmark, neither employment protection regulations nor tem-
porary employment rates has changed significantly. The relatively high
temporary employment rate in Denmark—even though employment
protection regulations are less strict than in Germany—can likely be
attributed to two factors: the comparatively high volume of voluntary
temporary employment and the still considerable level of active labor
market policy programs (e.g., subsidized employment and paid leave
arrangements).
Finally, regulations on temporary work agencies may also influ-
ence the use of temporary employment. Agency workers are a potential
alternative to permanent or fixed-term employees. Contracts for tem-
porary agency workers are also often signed for a fixed duration only.
Until 1995 in Germany, fixed-term contracts with agency workers were
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allowed only on the request of the employee. Since then, at least the
first deployment of a temporary agency worker can be on a fixed-term
basis. In Denmark, all regulations on temporary work agencies were
abolished in 1990. Therefore, the duration of the employment contract
depends on the individual agreement between agency and temporary
agency worker. Consistent information about the extent of agency
work in the EU countries is unavailable. Estimates by the World Feder-
ation of Temporary Work show that the importance of temporary work
agencies is relatively low in Denmark (0.3 percent of dependent
employment) and in Germany (0.7 percent of dependent employment)
compared, for example, with the Netherlands (4.6 percent) and France
(2.2 percent) (see Klös 2000; de Koning et al. 1999). Despite substan-
tial deregulation, the spread of agency work is still limited in Denmark.
However, in Germany, agency work has gained in importance even
though regulations are relatively strict. Nevertheless, the development
of temporary agency work in both countries must again be seen in the
context of different labor market performances and the availability of
other flexibility options. 
Recent studies illustrate that temporary work arrangements are
used as a complement to the core workforce as a way to reduce adjust-
ment costs (e.g., to business fluctuations) through more flexibility (see
Rudolph and Schröder 1997). Furthermore, using temporary employ-
ment during a probationary period (without any obligation) is attractive
to employers because it allows them to improve staff selection (see
Farber 1999; Rogowski and Schömann 1996). From this point of view,
relatively constant rates of temporary employment are compatible with
high levels of fluctuation in temporary work arrangements.
Part-Time Employment
The Netherlands has the highest percentage of part-time workers in
the EU, at 40 percent in 1998. Beyond the Netherlands, three countries
report percentages over 20 percent: the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Denmark. In Germany, the share of part-time employment is less than
20 percent. However, as a percentage of the workforce, only Denmark
has seen a decline whereas an upward trend can be observed in Ger-
many and in the majority of EU countries (Figures 2.8 and 2.9).
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A comparison of part-time work in Denmark and Germany by
demographic characteristics reveals remarkable differences. Figures
2.8 and 2.9 show that the differences in the percentage of part-time
workers can largely be attributed to the higher share of Danish men
who work part-time. The share of women in part-time work is nearly
identical in both countries.
There are also considerable differences by age. Danes between the
ages of 15 and 24 are more likely to work part-time than their German
counterparts. Further, this trend does not hold for those age 25 and
older, highlighting the importance of this difference. Part-time employ-
ment rates in Germany for those age 25 and older were 19 percent (4
percent for men and 39 percent for women) and 17 percent in Denmark
(6 percent for men and 31 percent for women). The comparatively high
share of young part-time workers may be surprising for a country such
as Denmark, with high participation rates in education.6 There are two
reasons for this situation. First, part-time work (or, alternatively, full-
time work) may be an integral part of the Danish vocational system,
where young persons alternate between education and learning at a
workplace. Second, part-time work is often done by pupils or students
to improve their standard of living with marginal employment.7
The ELFS and a recent survey by Infratest provide information
about the reasons why workers choose to work only part-time. The
ELFS data show that the number of female part-time workers in Den-
mark decreased mainly because fewer women work part-time on a vol-
untary basis. In contrast, voluntary, and to some extent involuntary,
part-time work has increased in Germany. The Infratest survey sug-
gests that a considerable proportion of German female part-time work-
ers choose this type of employment because they want or need more
time with their children (which reflects the low provision of child care
facilities in Germany). This motive is obviously less relevant in Den-
mark, where young people more often combine part-time work with
education (see Table 2.3).
Data on the demand for part-time work are available from the IAB
Establishment Panel (see Düll and Ellguth 1999). Until 1996, part-time
work had been growing in western Germany, independent of firm size.
Since then, more differentiation between companies has taken place.
Large companies used part-time work to a lesser degree than did small
firms. Compared with western Germany, there is still a part-time work
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Figure 2.8 Part-Time Rates by Gender in Denmark, 1983–98
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
Figure 2.9 Part-Time Rates by Gender in Germany,a 1983–98
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
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“gap” in the new Länder, although part-time work has expanded within
firms of all sizes. Multivariate analyses also show that in the old
Länder, in particular, the extensive use of part-time work is associated
with a certain segment of small and young enterprises. Innovation in
these firms is less developed than in firms with a lower share of part-
time work. Marginal part-time work (fewer than 14 hours a week) can
be found in firms with lower qualification levels and those without
works councils. Comparable data do not exist for Denmark. A study by
Bielenski and colleagues (1994) shows that Danish and German firms
share similar views on the advantages of part-time work. In both coun-
tries, flexibility and increased competitiveness were the main reasons
for using part-time work. In contrast, lower wage costs or lower social
security contributions played only a minor role.
In Denmark and Germany, there are certain institutional incentives
for part-time work, and, as noted, the incentives apply to part-time
work with few hours. Therefore, it is not surprising that marginal part-
time work plays a significant role in both countries. In Denmark, 8.1
percent of the employed (9.9 percent of women; 6.5 percent of men)
worked fewer than 15 hours per week in 1998. In Germany, 5.9 percent
(10.7 percent of women and 2.2 percent of men) worked fewer than 15
hours a week. Data from the ELFS also show an increase of marginal
part-time work in both countries. Whereas in Germany, part-time work
with low as well as long hours contributed to the expansion of part-
time work, this is not the case in Denmark, where part-time work with
long hours (more than 14 hours a week) declined. 
The decline of part-time work during the last decade in Denmark
was mainly driven by declines among women and is concentrated
among voluntary employment contracts with an average work week of
between 15 and 35 hours. However, the decline in female part-time
employment in Denmark is not a new phenomenon. The development
was already evident in the 1980s, albeit more hidden. At that time, the
downward trend was compensated for by an increase in part-time work
among men. However, in the 1990s, the increase flattened out, with
male part-time work remaining relatively constant. The continued
decline of part-time work among Danish women seems to be largely
associated with an institutional setting that favors female employment,
with such benefits as comprehensive child care facilities and separate
income taxation. The reduction of involuntary part-time employment
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Table 2.3 Reasons for Working Part-Time in Denmark and Germany, 
1998
Denmark Germany
All part-time workers N = 186 N = 371
Involuntary part-time work (could not find full-time job) 11% 2%
Is student 31% 14%
Is ill/disabled 5% 3%
Wants/needs enough time for children 25% 44%
Wants/needs enough time to care for elderly, ill, or 
disabled persons in the family
3% 4%
Other domestic commitments 1% 3%
Wants enough time for own activities (e.g., hobbies, 
political or cultural activities)
12% 3%
Earns enough working part-time, no need to earn money 3% 1%
Other reasons for voluntary part-time 3% 1%
No answer 6% 7%
Total 100% 100%
Female part-time workers N = 148 N = 291
Involuntary part-time work (could not find full-time job) 13% 19%
Is student 22% 8%
Is ill/disabled 5% 2%
Wants/needs enough time for children 28% 51%
Wants/needs enough time to care for elderly, ill, or 
disabled persons in the family
4% 4%
Other domestic commitments 1% 3%
Wants enough time for own activities (e.g., hobbies, 
political or cultural activities)
14% 3%
 Earns enough working part-time, no need to earn money 3% 2%
 Other reasons for voluntary part-time 2% 1%
 No answer 7% 8%
Total (base: employed persons who declare themselves 
part-time)
100% 100%
NOTE: Answers to survey questions, “I would like to ask you why you work part-time
rather than full-time. Is it because”; and “Why don’t you want a full-time job? Is it
because”. . . were recoded and multiple responses were eliminated (rank order as
above; i.e., respondents were only counted in the first of the categories listed above
that applied).
SOURCE: Employment Options of the Future Survey, carried out by Infratest Burke
Sozialforschung, Munich, on behalf of the European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin.
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during the upswing in Denmark contributed to the general decline in
part-time work and is associated with improving labor market condi-
tions.
In Germany, part-time employment took a different direction. Vol-
untary and involuntary part-time work increased continuously in the
1980s and 1990s. This increase occurred amid high unemployment,
low labor force participation (not the least due to a lack of child care
facilities), and measures to improve work flexibility at the beginning
and the end of working life (e.g., policies to promote partial retire-
ment). The fact that part-time employment has gained relatively little
acceptance in eastern Germany can largely be attributed to, among
other things, the lower income associated with it. The share of part-
time employment may expand further in the future, given new regula-
tions in 2001 concerning this part-time employment. Full-time employ-
ees now have a legal right to opt for part-time employment.8
CONCLUSION: MORE DIVERSITY OR NEW STANDARDS?
Analyses on the basis of the ELFS have shown that during 1985–
1998, the proportion of standard work arrangements declined in Ger-
many and increased in Denmark. In Germany, work arrangements have
shifted toward part-time dependent employment and self-employment.
Moreover, differentiation is more visible among nonstandard work
arrangements (e.g., more sole proprietorships or marginal part-time
employment). The renaissance of standard work arrangements in Den-
mark results from a decline in part-time employment, a small decline in
self-employment, and a nearly stagnant level of temporary employ-
ment.
Despite diverging trends in Denmark and Germany, the two coun-
tries both find that young employees are more affected by these forms
of employment (see Table 2.4). In Germany, the increase of nonstand-
ard work arrangements was more pronounced among young employees
than all employees. In Denmark, and counter to the nationwide trend,
nonstandard work arrangements are increasing among young employ-
ees. Nonstandard work arrangements obviously play an increasing role
as a bridge to standard work, mainly because they can reduce hurdles
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to subsequent integration into the labor market. In addition, this trend
of increasing levels of nonstandard work among young employees
reflects their frequent combination of education and work (e.g.,
apprenticeships and other types of learning at the workplace, as well as
marginal employment, which acts as a supplement to study grants).
Overall, there are no hints in Denmark or Germany that young employ-
ees may be socially excluded because of the growing number of non-
standard work arrangements.
Trends suggest that the decline in standard work arrangements in
Germany and the increase in Denmark may continue because of the
important role of part-time employment trends (see Figures 2.8 and
2.9). However, a warning against determinism in the development of
work arrangements is warranted. Two factors—normally not explicitly
considered in trend extrapolations—are relevant to the direction and
even strength of certain changes in the composition of work arrange-
ments: labor market performance and institutional incentives.
The change in work arrangements, particularly the diverging trends
in Denmark and Germany, reflects different labor market performances
in each country. Whereas in Denmark—a country with traditionally
high labor market participation—unemployment has declined since
1994, in Germany—a country with significantly lower labor market
participation—there was a severe labor market crisis between 1993 and
1998. The continuing decline in female part-time employment among
those working 15 to 35 hours a week in Denmark can, at least in part,
be seen as an exploitation of already scarce human resources. Supply-
side restrictions did not exist to a large extent because of comprehen-
sive child care facilities and significant incentives to work inherent in
the system of separate income taxation. Moreover, there was almost no
increase in self-employment (especially outside the agricultural sector)
since 1995 because of the high and increasing employment rate (espe-
cially for women with less tendency to become self-employed). Nearly
the opposite is the case in Germany, where self-employment is a state-
sponsored option for leaving the unemployment rolls. In addition, high
unemployment must be regarded as a “push factor” toward nonstand-
ard work arrangements. Nevertheless, compared with unemployment,
temporary employment and even involuntary part-time employment
are better alternatives than no job at all. 
44Table 2.4 Trends in Work Arrangements in Denmark and Germanya among Ages 15 to 24 Years
Denmark Germany
Work arrangements 1985 1990 1991 1998 1985 1990 1991 1998
Population age 15 to 24 yearsb 780 755 748 643 9,575 8,345 9,911 8,733
Total employmentb 521 491 484 428 5,039 4,831 5,661 3,939
Total employed in % of population 66.8 65.0 64.7 66.6 52.6 57.9 57.1 45.1
Self-employed and family workers 
(% of total employment)
1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.0
Family workers 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.7
Self-employed 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.2
With employees 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3
Without employees 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.9
Self-employed and family 
workers working part-time
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.9
Total dependent employment
(% of total employment)
98.8 98.8 99.2 98.8 94.6 98.1 98.0 98.1
Employees working full time 68.9 59.5 60.3 50.7 94.6 93.5 93.6 88.5
Permanent employment 42.2 36.7 35.7 29.0 64.8 60.4 63.3 39.5
Standard work arrangements
Temporary employment 26.7 22.8 24.6 21.7 28.7 31.4 28.6 48.6
Apprentices, trainees, etc. 18.6 18.1 19.0 16.1 24.6 23.2 20.9 39.9
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Other persons on fixed-term 
contracts
8.1 4.7 5.6 5.6 4.1 8.2 7.8 8.7
No response 1.1 1.7 1.7 0.4
Employees working part-time 
(% of total employment)
29.9 39.3 38.8 47.9 3.0 4.5 44.4 9.6
Permanent employment 20.9 32.6 30.8 42.8 2.2 2.8 2.9 7.1
Temporary employment 6.5 6.7 8.1 5.4 0.7 1.3 1.1 2.2
Apprentices, trainees, etc. 0.2
Other persons on fixed-term 
contracts
6.5 6.7 8.1 5.1 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.8
No response 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3
a Data from 1985 and 1990 represent West Germany, while 1991 and 1998 represent unified Germany.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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The institutional setting seems to be at least an equally important
explanation for the diverging trends in the two countries. However, we
must emphasize that standard work arrangements in Denmark and Ger-
many are not comparable in qualitative terms; standard work arrange-
ments are different types of employment in the two countries. The
standard work arrangement in Denmark is not as burdened by social
security contributions and strict regulations as in Germany. Therefore,
the present erosion of standard work arrangements in Germany need
not necessarily lead to future diversity in work arrangements. The ero-
sion may also indicate the need for reforms of the standard work
arrangement. 
Notes
We thank the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Con-
ditions in Dublin for providing us with data from the recent survey “Employment
Options of the Future“ covering all EU member states and Norway. We also thank,
particularly, David Autor from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
and the editor, Susan Houseman, for commenting on an earlier version of the paper.
1. The data used in this chapter are taken from special tabulations of the ELFS for
the years 1983 to 1998 provided by Eurostat. See the appendix for more informa-
tion on the data and definitions of certain wage arrangements. 
2. Without taking into account family workers, the share of self-employed increased
in the Netherlands and Germany by almost 1 percentage point in the period under
investigation. 
3. The term standard work arrangements is used here in a broad sense and still con-
sists of heterogeneous types of employment. It includes manual and nonmanual
employees as well as civil servants and career military personnel. In this respect,
one must take into account that, e.g., in Germany, civil servants do actually have a
permanent tenure and cannot easily be dismissed. 
4. The figure is based on a survey from 1994. The ELFS does not include any crite-
ria on the distinction in labor law terms between worker status and self-employed
status and therefore on the definition of nominally self-employed workers. 
5. A self-employed person is regarded as dependent employed if the following char-
acteristics are fulfilled: he or she mainly depends on a single client, does not have
his or her own business premises and tools, does not employ regular employees,
and his or her activities are not typical for an entrepreneur.
6. In Denmark, 71.9 percent of persons between ages 15 and 25 were in education in
1998 (in Germany, 68.4 percent).
7. Youth account for 74 percent of marginal employment in Denmark (part-time
employment between 1 and 9 hours per week). This is also due to the fact that stu-
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dents at a higher educational level are allowed to earn only a certain amount of
money every year. Full-time work would definitely cause a loss of their study
grant. However, the grant itself makes some supplementary income necessary for
most students.
8. The right cannot be enforced in companies with fewer than 15 workers or in larger
companies if proven reasons prevent the use of (more) part-time workers.
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Appendix
The Eurostat Labor Force Survey (ELFS)
The Eurostat Labor Force Survey is carried out annually in the spring (in
Germany within the scope of the sample survey Mikrozensus). The survey
gathers information on labor force characteristics of individuals during a par-
ticular reference week. (Germany uses a fixed reference week; Denmark uses
evenly distributed reference weeks.) The survey covers the resident population
living in private households. Persons living in collective households (homes,
boarding schools, hospitals, etc.), and persons performing compulsory military
service are excluded. 
Definitions and Explanatory Notes 
Standard work arrangements are based on a permanent, full-time relation-
ship in an employee status that is subject to basic social security. Included are
manual and nonmanual employees and civil servants, including career military
personnel. In this respect, employment relationships of German civil servants
and those of other employees are not completely comparable. Special labor
laws apply to civil servants; for example, they have permanent tenure and can-
not easily be dismissed.
Permanency of the job. This question is addressed only to employees. The
termination of a fixed-term job or work contract is determined by objective
conditions (e.g., reaching a certain date, completion of an assignment, return of
another employee who has been temporarily replaced). Included are persons
with a contract covering a period of training, such as apprentices, trainees, re-
search assistants, and so forth, or for a probationary period, and persons with a
seasonal job. 
Active labor market programs (e.g., job creation in eastern Germany, job
rotation in Denmark) influence the number of temporary employees. ELFS
data do not allow for distinguishing the participants in these programs from
other temporary employees. Also, temporary agency workers are not defined
in the ELFS. In addition, individuals engaged by an employment agency may
have a work contract of unlimited duration.
Full-time versus part-time. The determination of full-time and part-time
work is made based on a spontaneous answer given by the respondent. Com-
paring the answers with the number of “hours usually worked” reveals that, in
both Denmark and Germany, “part-time” rarely exceeds 35 hours, while “full-
time” usually begins at about 35 hours.
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Self-employed are subdivided between employers who employ at least one
other person, and those without other employees. 
Comparability between the Results of Successive Surveys
The unification of West and East Germany in 1990 caused a break in the
time series. Data prior to 1991 refer to West Germany before unification; from
1991, data refer to a unified Germany, including the new German Länder. De-
velopments before and after unification are not comparable. The subdivision of
all German data into western and eastern Germany for 1998 is based on the na-
tional survey, Mikrozensus.
Comparability over time may also be affected by changes in the question-
naire. In Germany, the increase in part-time employment is due, in part, to ad-
ditional questions referring to employment status (1990 and 1996).
Nevertheless, the number of “marginal part-time jobs” (fewer than 15 hours per
week) in Germany is still assumed to be underestimated. Because of the design
of the ELFS, persons who regularly do marginal part-time work are more likely
to be registered, whereas persons who do such an activity only occasionally are
underrecorded. 
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